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You are free, therefore choose—that is to say, invent.  
Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme 
Philosophy, and especially metaphysics, has often been attacked on either epistemic 
or semantic grounds.  Anything outside of experience and the laws of logic is said to be un-
knowable, and according to Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, there are no such things 
to know; metaphysical disputes are either meaningless or merely verbal.  This was thought to 
explain philosophy’s supposed lack of progress:  philosophers argue endlessly and fruitlessly 
precisely because they are not really saying anything about matters of fact (Wittgenstein 
1953, Remark 402; Carnap 1950). 
Since the mid-twentieth century, the tide has been against such views, and metaphys-
ics has re-established itself within the analytic tradition.  Ontology, essentialism, and de re 
necessity have regained credibility in many eyes and are often investigated by excavating in-
tuitions of obscure origin.  Relatedly, externalist semantic theories have claimed that meaning 
or reference has a secret life of its own, largely unfettered by our understanding and inten-
tions (Kripke 1971; 1972; Putnam 1973; 1975a).  ‘Water,’ it is claimed, would denote H2O 
even if we had never discovered that particular molecular structure, and this is allied with the 
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view that such structure is metaphysically essential to water—that water could not have been 
otherwise (Kripke 1971; 1972). 
I wish to explore a third way, an approach to philosophical problems that is sympa-
thetic to Wittgenstein and the positivists’ diagnosis of philosophy (“[P]hilosophical problems 
arise when language goes on holiday,” 1953, Remark 38), while rejecting their gloomy prog-
nosis and Wittgenstein’s anti-interventionist prescription (“Philosophy leaves everything as it 
is,” 1953, Remark 124).  I will call this third way the Method of Conceptual Articulation 
(MCA).  In general, it consists in refining or modifying concepts, or engineering altogether 
new ones, so that an apparently “empty” question acquires a satisfying answer—or if you 
prefer, so that some related, more specific question emerges that has a definite answer and is 
relevant to some motivation.1  When we find that we have posed a question that we ourselves 
do not entirely understand, we should not demand, ‘Still, what is the true answer?’ but step 
back and ask, ‘What more precisely would we really like to know?’  In this way, even ques-
tions that are metaphysical in the pejorative Viennese sense, questions with no factual an-
swers (if such there be), can nonetheless be answered, for they can be given cognitive con-
tent,2 and perhaps in a well motivated way.  By refining or modifying our concepts and ques-
tions, I think we can “fill” some initially empty questions, and even solve philosophical prob-
lems, which I define here as finding definite answers that are relevant to our motivations. 
This approach is partly inspired by, and endorses, a certain libertarianism that one 
                                                 
1
 The MCA has many precedents, perhaps most clearly in Carnap 1950.  But there the connection between on-
tology and language choice was treated as another way to dismiss metaphysics rather than rehabilitate it. 
2
 Of course, this depends on how we individuate questions.  If we suppose that any change in cognitive content 
(induced by a change in language or theory) implies that we are dealing with a different question, then trivially 
the content of a question can never change.  But this seems to be a purely verbal issue; I do not think anything 
here rides on it. 
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finds in the views and practices of at least some modern mathematicians, namely the view 
that we are free to develop concepts and introduce objects as we wish, provided they do not 
spawn inconsistency.  As Cantor put it, “Mathematics is entirely free in its development, 
bound only by the self-evident concern that its concepts be both internally without contradic-
tion and stand in definite relations, organized by means of definitions, to previously formed, 
already existing and proven concepts” ([1893] 1976, 79).  On that view, whatever we can 
consistently define is a legitimate object of study.  More recently, Wilder wrote of modern 
abstract algebra,  
From this it is evident that the modern mathematician has lost the qualms of his fore-
bears regarding the ‘reality’ of a ‘number’ (or other mathematical entity).  His criteria 
of acceptance are of a completely different sort, involving such matters as consis-
tency, utility of the concept, and the like.  (1968, 148)   
 
On that view, the reputed uncritical realism of working mathematicians does not in general 
limit their freedom, for it is no longer reserved for intuitively appealing structures like the 
natural numbers or Euclidean space.  One internally consistent concept or mathematical the-
ory is no more true or real than another.  Hence Cantor wrote that if a proposed object satis-
fies his above conditions, “mathematics can and must regard it as existent and real” (ibid.).  
To be sure, many mathematicians are concerned not only with consistency but with the le-
gitimacy of the objects they introduce, in some broader sense that may depend on utility, in-
tuition, elegance, and so on.  Such practical and aesthetic concerns may even provide some 
evidence of consistency, which itself is usually quite difficult to prove, but they are not the 
same thing as consistency, much less reality or truth.  For the libertarian, there is no question 
of the truth for a definition or axiom, for such things make no claim of fact.  They only stipu-
late linguistic conventions and determine a domain of discourse. 
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As evidence that this has become a popular view among mathematicians, I would cite 
the emergence of non-Euclidean geometries, the trend in function theory from more to less 
restricted concepts of function (Jourdain 1906-13; Maddy 1993; 1997) and the ascendance of 
the big-tent notion of set that Maddy calls Combinatorialism (op cit.), the latter two of which 
Cantor himself played important parts in.  But if the reader is unconvinced, no matter; noth-
ing I have to say here depends on it.  I mention this libertarianism only to illustrate the kind 
of approach I have in mind, and as a significant element in Cantor’s views, which we will 
discuss at length.  If libertarianism and the related MCA do not reflect the views and prac-
tices of most mathematicians, I would urge them to reconsider.  We should study mathemati-
cal practice to determine what works and improve our understanding of mathematics.  We 
should not regard the prevailing practice as sacred.  
I believe that several philosophical problems have already been solved by means ap-
proximating the MCA, but rarely deliberately.  Those who have solved philosophical prob-
lems by articulating new concepts have typically thought that they were discovering deep 
facts, not stipulating definitions.  Still, in several cases, a problem was in fact solved by arti-
culating concepts that addressed concerns more specific than the initial question.  One exam-
ple was the problem of the world systems, ultimately put to bed by Newton’s refinement of 
the concept of motion and his successful theory of gravitation.3  Another lies in recent exten-
sions of decidability to the continuous context (Myrvold 1997, Parker 2003, 2005, 2006).  A 
more overtly metaphysical example that quite clearly employs the MCA is Parfit’s work on 
                                                 
3
 DiSalle (2002; 2006) reads Newton’s Scholium to the Definitions in the Principia as giving a definition (pre-
sumably stipulative) of absolute space and absolute motion.  This would fit wonderfully with my methodology, 
but it does not seem to fit Newton’s text.  Newton seems rather to have made metaphysical claims about abso-
lute space and motion.  Still, such claims performed the function of giving those notions empirical content and 
rendering the Copernican question determinate.  
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personal identity (1971; 1984).  I hope to discuss these and other examples elsewhere.  The 
one I will consider here is Cantor’s extension of the concept of number to the transfinite, and 
the resolution this supplies for “Galileo’s Paradox”4 (Galileo [1638] 1954), namely that the 
square numbers seem to be at once fewer than and equal to the positive integers.5 
There, too, the MCA was not applied deliberately.  The historical figures discussed 
below—Galileo, Bolzano, and Cantor—did not see themselves as altogether freely stipulating 
useful new conventions, but either as drawing conclusions about the relative size of infinite 
collections, or, in Cantor’s case, as extending the concept of numerosity6 in a constrained 
way.  Nonetheless, key elements of the MCA are reflected in some of their remarks and ar-
guments.  I will argue in light of their writings that, whatever those authors may have 
thought, questions of transfinite numerosity were in certain senses indeterminate, and Can-
tor’s extensions of numerosity were stipulated more freely than some of his remarks would 
suggest.  His stipulations—in particular the notion of power—not only served to resolve Gali-
leo’s Paradox (which Galileo and Bolzano had also done, in different ways), but at least par-
tially solved the broader philosophical problem of transfinite numerosity insofar as it helped 
to address major background concerns.  The main evidence that the MCA can work, then, is 
that it has worked.  (Note that I do not claim that the MCA is part of standard mathematical 
                                                 
4
 The paradox far pre-dates Galileo; see note 18.  I use the word ‘paradox’ throughout in the sense of a contra-
diction engendered by otherwise plausible suppositions.  (Assuming the law of non-contradiction, I do not see 
what else a paradox could be.) 
5
 Cantor himself paid little attention to that paradox, but he did present a version of it (with the square numbers 
replaced by the even numbers), not as a paradox but merely an illustration of a property of powers (1878, 242-
3).  He also alluded to the some phenomenon in a couple of other places, as we will see.  
6
 Throughout this essay I use ‘numerosity’ to denote the general notion of cardinal number, i.e., number-of-
elements, without presupposing Cantor’s analysis of that concept.  Cantor’s “cardinal number” will be called 
power, as he initially called it. 
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practice, only that it, or something quite close to it, has been successfully applied to some 
philosophical problems, in mathematics and elsewhere.) 
If indeed the MCA has sometimes been successful in the realm of mathematics, there 
is a further question as to whether it can be (or as I suggest, already has been) useful in more 
general metaphysics.  Of course, the problem of the infinite is traditional metaphysics par 
excellence.  Nonetheless, I will not argue here for the broader applicability of the MCA.  I 
have mentioned some applications that I wish to discuss elsewhere, and I hope to apply it to 
others as well.  The broad success of the method can then be evaluated in terms of those ap-
plications.  Here let us bracket that question and focus on mathematics. 
In Section I, I further articulate and contextualize the method.  I describe a roughly 
Wittgenstinian picture of concepts and Cantor’s related notion of concept splitting.  I then 
state a naïve version of the method, raise some possible objections, and finally mention a 
modified method that avoids most of the difficulties.  Section II reviews Galileo’s Paradox 
and his motivations for presenting it.  There I argue that, in concluding that the concept of 
relative size cannot be applied to the infinite, he was in a certain sense right, and Cantor, in 
claiming that there is no contradiction in cases like Galileo’s Paradox, was wrong.7  In Sec-
tion III, I review Bolzano’s position, that proper subsets are always smaller and bijection is 
not sufficient for equinumerosity.  I argue from Duggan’s (1999) order extension theorem 
that Bolzano was not simply mistaken; the relation of proper subset can be extended to a gen-
eral concept of number quite different from Cantor’s.  Section IV evaluates Cantor’s me-
thods, his own perspective on his work, and the success of his theory in addressing some ma-
jor concerns common to all three of our historical figures.  Section V briefly criticizes 
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 This is not an attack on Cantor’s theory.  The point is just that his theory required a conceptual innovation in 
order to escape Galileo’s Paradox (and it was not the only such innovation possible). 
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Gödel’s arguments for absolutism about the concept of cardinal number and touches on some 
more recent debates about realism in mathematics.  Section VI concludes with brief summary 
remarks. 
I. THE METHOD 
The approach to philosophical problems considered here emerges from a certain pic-
ture of concepts and of how philosophical problems arise, a picture derived from Wittgens-
tein, Waismann, and to some extent Kant.  [Kant suggested that the antinomies arise from 
stretching our concepts beyond their proper domains ([1781] 1998, Aii ff.), an idea antic-
ipated by Galileo ([1638] 1954, 31, quoted below).]  Elements of this picture can even be 
found in Cantor’s remarks, as we will see.   
Wittgenstein pointed out in the early sections of the Investigations (1953) that many 
of our concepts do not have any tidy set of necessary and sufficient conditions.  He used the 
metaphor of a rope, which derives its unity from its many overlapping fibers rather than a 
single pervasive thread.  Another apt metaphor would be that of a well worn rag.  Typically, 
our informal concepts are woven of many strands:  various conditions or properties, similari-
ties between instances, and different approximately equivalent characterizations.  They fray 
at the edges, where borderline cases arise (“degree vagueness,” as Alston called it in 1964).  
They also have holes:  cases that do not lie on a fuzzy boundary but rather are omitted from 
classification altogether (“combination-of-conditions vagueness”, ibid.).8  They can be 
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 Alston’s “degree vagueness” is the sorites type, consisting in “the lack of a precise cut-off point along some 
dimension” (1964, 87), while “combination-of-conditions vagueness” consists simply in the indeterminacy of 
the truth conditions for a term (87-88).  Waismann’s famous notion of open texture (1945) is related.  Originally 
called porosität—literally, ‘porosity’—it is, on one reading, just what I mean by holes, i.e., combination-of-
conditions vagueness.  But as Ackerman (1994) points out, Waismann further distinguishes open texture as in-
eliminable; no definition can completely remove it.  Our rag picture is partly motivated by a suspicion that such 
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stretched to cover new cases, but, as Cantor noticed, stretched too far they will tear (Figure 
1).  When we extend a concept beyond its usual domain, we may find that it comes apart, so 
that some characteristic conditions are no longer mutually consistent, or various formulations 
are no longer equivalent.     
Cantor pointed out just such a case.  He of course extended the concept of number in 
two directions, that of Anzahl9 (later called ordinal number) and that of power (Mächtigkeit, 
later called cardinal number).  For any finite set, Cantor observed, Anzahl and power coincide 
and determine each other, but not so for the infinite; two infinite sets can have the same pow-
er but different Anzahlen.  Hence, as Cantor put it, “the whole concept of number...in a  
certain sense splits up into two concepts when we ascend to the infinite” ([1883b] 1976, 78, 
Cantor’s emphasis).  In fact, it splits into more concepts than that, for other notions of trans-
finite number are possible, as I will explain in Section III.  (Besides those discussed here, 
another alternative notion is given in Buzaglo 2002.)  
When concepts split, we may be puzzled as to what we really had in mind in the first 
place.  Which criteria truly characterize the original notion?  But this is often a misguided  
                                                                                                                                                        
ineliminable vagueness exists and is even the rule, but that is inessential to the present considerations. 
 Such vagueness should also be distinguished from outright category errors.  The emptiness of ‘What 
time is it on the sun?’, for example, is not due to vagueness but to a definite inapplicability.  Nonetheless, it 
seems we could modify the concept of time-of-day to cover that case. 
9
 Cantor also described order type (a generalization of Anzahl) as the natural extension of the concept of number 
([1895-7] 1915, 117).   
There is some disagreement about the sense of ‘Anzahl’ in Cantor’s hand.  Ordinarily this word is 
translated as ‘number,’ ‘cardinal number,’ or ‘number of elements,’ contradicting Cantor’s later designation of 
his Anzahlen as the ordinal numbers.  Tait (2000) on the other hand, reads Anzahl as ‘counting number,’ and 
elsewhere (1996) treats this as a synonym for ‘ordinal.’  Cantor did refer to an Anzahl as the result of counting 
([1883] 1976, 75), but note that this is consistent with regarding it as a measure of numerosity (relative to an 
ordering).  To avoid any anachronism or prejudice, I will simply use ‘Anzahl.’ 
9 
 
 
 Figure 1.  A concept that has been stretched too far. 
question.  The original appeal of the concept, in its established domain of application, may 
have been due to the concurrence of several conditions or characterizations.  For example, 
part of the value of ordinal number, in the sense of ‘position in a sequence,’10 is that for finite 
sets it coincides with cardinal number or numerosity.  This after all is what makes it possible 
to count; we correlate finite numbers with the elements of the set being counted, and the last 
position we reach in the sequence of numbers indicates the numerosity of the set.  Thus, both 
cardinal number and ordinal, and the fact that they concur, and as well the condition that 
proper subsets are always smaller—all of these and more are what truly characterize the orig-
inal concept of number.  When such concurrent conditions diverge, there may be no uniquely 
right way to extend the concept, and hence a question that stretches a concept beyond its 
usual domain may have no uniquely correct answer.  To obtain answers, we have to refine or 
                                                 
10
 Cantor’s “ordinal numbers” are not merely positions in a sequence.  They are ordered sets of “units” that 
represent the “order type,” in effect the structure, of a well-ordered set ([1895-7] 1915).  They are not the 
grammarian’s ordinals. 
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modify the concepts involved. 
So far we have made free use of the notion of “the concept of X,” but this requires cla-
rification on a number of fronts.  In general we will use ‘concept’ to denote some disjunction 
of conditions.  Like Frege, we have in mind a logical object, not a psychological one.  But to 
speak of the concept of number, for example, leaves open the question of which conditions 
count.  They might be those associated with the word ‘number’ by everyone in some commu-
nity, or by the “competent” speakers of a language (which requires further clarification), or 
by a particular individual.  They may be the conditions regarded as constituting the meaning 
of ‘number,’ or they may include all commonly held beliefs about number.  Or, the concept 
of number might be something more objective, a somehow distinguished set of conditions 
that we may not even be aware of.  These distinctions will be helpful in understanding the 
views of our historical figures. 
Like typical concepts, the MCA can be refined in various ways.  One naïve version is 
as follows:      
The Naïve Method of Motivational Analysis (NMMA) 
(1)  Establish that the question at hand, as stated, has no uniquely determined answer.  
(2)  Identify background motivations for the question, either practical or theoretical.  
(3)  Refine or extend the concepts involved in the question so that under the amended con-
cepts, the question does have a determinate answer and is relevant to the background motiva-
tions. 
 
Some clarifications are in order.  
There are different senses in which a question can have no unique answer.  Olson 
(2006) suggests that even vague questions have definite answers, for if a case is vague, then 
the assertion of vagueness is itself the uniquely correct answer.  But if we ask, as in our ex-
ample below, ‘Is A greater than B,’ then ‘The question is vague’ is not in the normal sense an 
answer to the question, for the question presupposes an answer of ‘yes’ or ‘no.’  The assertion 
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of vagueness is just a way of denying that there is a uniquely correct answer.  Other res-
ponses, such as ‘Those terms do not apply,’ and ‘Only to degree x,’ are quite different from 
the former.  They do not assert semantic indeterminacy, but a category error; they imply an 
established usage that definitely rules out a simple yes-or-no answer.  Such differences im-
pinge on the nature of a conceptual amendment, for if the question is genuinely indetermi-
nate, there is room to refine or extend concepts without transgressing established limits on 
usage, but not if the question commits a definite category error.  Still, even if a particular ap-
plication of a concept or word is definitively ruled out, we may be to extend its domain none-
theless, changing its content.  (I will explain shortly why this is not obviously true.)  The 
main purpose of step (1), besides removing the temptation to keep looking for straightforward 
answers (e.g., yes or no), is to prevent us revising concepts that are already doing good work 
(though sometimes non-cumulative revisions are necessary).  But there does not appear to be 
much danger in extending a concept beyond previously imposed limitations of scope, howev-
er definite, so long as logical consistency is maintained.    
A question that arises about step (2) is, whose motivations should we consider?11  The 
method is intended to serve those who apply it, so in using it one should consider one’s own 
motives.  But we can choose our motives, and one might choose to address someone else’s 
concerns.  So in general, the goals considered might be anyone’s or even no one’s, but the 
success of a conceptual innovation or refinement—the question of whether it constitutes a 
solution in the sense I have given—is then relativized to those goals.  To address the histori-
cal question of whether the method was successfully applied to a particular problem, we 
merely ask whether anyone’s motives were considered, and whether the sharpened question 
addressed those motives.  It matters little, for that purpose, whose motives they were, but then 
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 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
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the resulting answer is only a solution relative to those motives.  In the present case, we will 
see that all three of our historical figures had related motives that were indeed addressed by 
Cantor’s solution. 
When we can apply the NMMA, we really ought to.  The steps themselves imply that 
the method will succeed in a way that addresses what is important to us, as long as the steps 
can be carried out, and step (1) protects us from doing damage to other useful concepts and 
theories.  But there are several reasons to worry whether the method can be executed.  The 
presupposition that we can determine whether a given question has a unique answer is chal-
lenged by Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction (1951), externalist semantics 
(Kripke 1971; 1972; Putnam 1973; 1975a), and the mere fact that analytic philosophers have 
struggled a hundred years or more to discern meanings and meaningfulness, with limited suc-
cess.  The threat from externalism is that we might not have epistemic access to the meaning 
or reference of our own expressions.  If water denoted H2O long before hydrogen and oxygen 
were even discovered, as Kripke and Putnam claim, then how can we be sure what our own 
words denote, and hence whether a given question is really empty or not?   The NMMA also 
presupposes the apparent truism that we are masters of our own language—that we can revise 
our concepts to make our expressions mean whatever we want.  This too is challenged by a 
form of externalism, namely Lewis’s notion of a reference magnet, something that draws ref-
erence to it in virtue of its natural “eligibility” (1983; 1984; Hodes 1984; Sider 2001; forth-
coming).  How strong after all are these magnets, and can we override them?  
A further worry is that we might not be able to perform step (2), to identify motiva-
tions more specific than the initial question.  In fact, it is characteristic of philosophy and 
pure science that the main goal is extremely general:  to understand.  In the spirit of pure in-
vestigation we often pose puzzles without knowing exactly what we are looking for or having 
any specific purpose in mind.  Wittgenstein provides an apt (and peculiarly bawdy) illustra-
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tion:  many problems are “like the problem set by the king in the fairy tale who told the prin-
cess to come neither naked nor dressed, and she came wearing fishnet...He didn’t really know 
what he wanted her to do, but when she came thus he was forced to accept it” (from a lecture 
quoted in Ambrose 1959).12  Moreover, even if there are distinct background motivations, it 
may be very difficult to discern them until after a solution is given.  Otherwise there would 
not be much of a philosophical problem.   
Supposing we can identify motivations, the final step is to construct concepts that will 
make our question determinate and relevant.  In some cases this may be easy, but in others, it 
may require superhuman foresight, and this likely describes Cantor’s case.  Among the back-
ground motivations for his theory were desires to understand the structure of continuous 
spaces and other infinite point sets, the representability and integrability of functions, and the 
relations between numerosity and geometric magnitude (e.g., length or volume).13  To foresee 
that the concept of power would be so useful to those ends would have required genius 
beyond even Cantor’s, and as we will see, Cantor only recognized the great importance of the 
concept, and adopted it as a notion of number, gradually, as applications occurred and a rich 
theory developed.   
A final grave worry is that the method does not accurately describe the history of the 
example under consideration:  Galileo’s Paradox and its resolution.  Indeed, for the most part 
it does not fit the views of the participants.  But I will argue that in fact, extensions of the 
concept of numerosity were freely stipulated; that Cantor developed his concepts of numeros-
ity gradually, in light of motivations, applications, and results; that he had certain motivations 
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 I do not, like Wittgenstein, think this characterizes all mathematical problems, but many philosophical ones. 
13
 As we will discuss, Ferreirós (2004) argues that Cantor’s dominant motivations lay not in mainstream mathe-
matical concerns like function theory but in metaphysics and natural philosophy.  However, he certainly had 
these more specific mathematical goals as well, and some were stimulated by his broader motivations.  
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in common with Galileo and Bolzano; and that his concepts of numerosity proved particular-
ly pertinent to those motivations.   
Some of the above difficulties can be avoided by restricting our attention to matters of 
logical consequence rather than truth.  Given a particular set of concepts, expressed as a set of 
propositions, i.e., a theory, we may well be able to determine whether or not an answer to a 
given question follows from that theory, along with other, uncontroversially determinate 
propositions14 and the standard laws of logic (or some other set of laws if you like).  We need 
not distinguish between definitions in the theory and factual hypotheses; just throw them all 
in.  Whether or not there is a genuine analytic/synthetic distinction, the determinacy of the 
answer to a question relative to a given theory does not depend on it.  We need only remem-
ber that such determinacy or indeterminacy is then relative to a theory (and the laws of logic 
employed, if those are not in fact immutable).  Furthermore, reference no longer enters into 
the matter.  Even if we cannot tell whether reference determines an answer to our question, 
we may still be able to establish logical independence.  We need only find two models of the 
theory which give different answers to the question.   
We could generalize our method further and avoid even more of the difficulties.  Giv-
en a seemingly unanswerable question, we might proceed roughly as follows: 
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 We may simply stipulate a set of propositions assumed to have determinate truth values.  For the logical posi-
tivists, these were observations or sense data; for Newton’s problem of giving empirical meaning to absolute 
motion, they would have been the propositions of relative position and motion; here they include the relations of 
relative size among finite sets, and the relations of proper subset-hood and 1-1 correspondence among infinite 
sets. 
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The Generalized Method of Theory Revison (GMTR)15 
(1) Propose a theory. 
(2) Attempt to deduce an answer to the question. 
(3) Evaluate the fruits of the theory (especially the motivations that it serves). 
(4) As with shampoo, repeat as necessary. 
 
Here we omit the step of showing that the question has no determinate answer, for even if it 
does, we can, if we wish, just propose a new theory that better serves our motivations.  We 
also avoid the problem of identifying our background motivations and engineering appropri-
ate concepts in advance.  We can just as well propose a theory first and then examine the in-
terests that it serves.  Note that the purpose of step (3), ‘Evaluate the fruits,’ is not to judge 
the legitimacy of a theory or conceptual innovation, much less its truth or reality.  In the con-
text of mathematics, that would contradict the libertatianism I have advocated above:  the 
claim that one logically consistent mathematical concept is no more real or true than another.  
But we are concerned here with developing concepts or theories that serve our motives.  The 
point of step (3) is to determine whether the problem has been solved in that sense.    
The question of whether we can override reference magnets is still troubling.  We 
may propose a theory that answers our initially mysterious question, but reference magnetism 
might imply that the resulting theory is not in fact about its intended subject, and it may con-
sequently be false even if it is true of its intended subject.  However, it is hard to see how 
such considerations would bear on our understanding.  Say for example we want to have a 
theory about a clear liquid with molecular structure XYZ.  We construct a theory of XYZ and 
deduce lots of enlightening consequences.  But suppose that, despite our intentions, the 
theory is really about H2O, because H2O is a very strong reference magnet, and suppose our 
                                                 
15Of course, this is just the standard hypothetico-deductive method of empirical science, with the usual step of 
testing predictions radically generalized to “Evaluate the fruits,” but it is meant to apply as well to mathematical 
and philosophical theories, in order to evaluate, not their truth, but their interest and usefulness. 
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theory is false with regard to H2O.  What does it matter?  The consequences we have deduced 
are still true of their intended referent, as desired.  If somehow they are not true simpliciter, 
that would seem, in this case, to be an irrelevant technicality.  How can reference matter here 
if it plays no role in our understanding or our use of language?16 
In any case, the GMTR fits more easily than the NMMA with historical examples, in-
cluding the one discussed below.  Cantor did not argue that the question posed by Galileo’s 
Paradox was initially empty, nor regard himself as freely stipulating the nature and existence 
of transfinite numbers, but he certainly did propose a new theory that provided a solution to 
the paradox, derive consequences, and evaluate the fruits.  Of course, this is not saying much.  
The GMTR is so loose that nearly any theoretical development will instantiate it.  The impor-
tant point is that mysterious philosophical questions can thus be made determinate and rele-
vant to our concerns.  By augmenting or revising our language or theory, we can obtain an-
swers that bear on our broader purposes.17 
However, the GMTR does not so much resolve our difficulties as dodge them, and by 
abandoning step (1) of the NMMA, it threatens to undo with willy-nilly revisions as much 
progress as it achieves.  In what follows I will leave the GMTR aside and try to exhibit the 
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 I have ignored here serious questions about just what a theory of reference is supposed to assert—whether it 
makes genuine claims of fact or rather proposes a convention of interpretation, whether it is supposed to be 
completely adequate or a limited toy model, etc.  (One might argue that we can diagonalize our way out of any 
given theory of reference just by stipulating that in certain cases reference will work differently.)  
17
 There are further questions as to which propositions are essential to a theory, and which ones are not only 
determined by the theory but meaningful in some further sense.  We might, for example, add to Newton’s theory 
of gravitation the statement ‘Discontent is orange,’ making that sentence part of a useful theory, but in a clearly 
ad hoc and unhelpful way.  We would like to have some way of distinguishing such inessential appendages to a 
theory from its integral, functional elements, but that is essentially the problem that hobbled logical positivism 
(Hempel 1950) even before Quine’s “Two Dogmas” (1951).  Perhaps the “evaluate” and “repeat” steps of the 
GMTR can help, but I make no attempt to resolve the problem here.  I only make the modest claim that a state-
ment can sometimes gain determinacy and relevance in virtue of a new concept or theory.    
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extent to which the resolution of Galileo’s Paradox can be assimilated to the NMMA or 
something close to it.  But I will focus on logical implication, ignoring worries about exter-
nalism and reference magnets until we reach the discussion of Gödel’s realism.  After all, if, 
as I argue, something close to the NMMA has in fact worked, there is little to fear from the 
objections I have mentioned. 
II.  GALILEO 
Galileo points out in his last dialogue ([1638] 1954, 32) that the square numbers (1, 4, 
9, 16,...) are clearly fewer than the “numbers” (the positive integers 1, 2, 3, 4...), for the latter 
include the squares as well as many more.  Yet, he goes on to show, these two collections are 
equal, since they can be placed in a one-to-one correspondence; just match each square with 
its root.  So the two collections are at once equal and unequal.18  Galileo’s protagonist Salvia-
ti concludes that infinities “transcend our finite understanding” (26), and “the attributes 
‘equal,’ ‘greater,’ and ‘less,’ are not applicable to infinite, but only to finite, quantities” 
(32).19   
Some may regard this as simply a naïve mistake, though excusably so, given its date.  
Not all readers will agree, but often it is taken for granted that Cantorian set theory resolves 
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 There is a nearly continuous family of similar paradoxes going back to the distantly related Wheel Paradox 
from around the 4th century BCE (Sambursky 1959; Murdoch 1982; Gardies 1984; Duhem [1954] 1985;  Tho-
mas 1958; Rabinovitch 1970).  Notably, Duns Scotus, around 1302, compared the odd and the even numbers to 
the whole numbers and even anticipated Cantor in rejecting what we will call Euclid’s Principle (Gardies 1984, 
45-6).  Gregory of Rimini, around 1346, adopted an approach surprisingly close to the MCA:  he distinguished 
two senses of ‘larger,’ the “improper” one corresponding to Euclid’s Principle, and the “proper” corresponding 
to what we will call Hume’s Principle (Duhem [1954] 1985, 111-12).  However, he offered this more as a con-
ceptual analysis than an innovation, and still suggested by his ‘proper/improper’ terminology that the Humean 
notion of larger was the uniquely correct one. 
19
 According to Duhem ([1954] 1985, 89ff.), this was also held by Duns Scotus and several subsequent mediev-
als. 
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the paradox in the only way possible.  As we now know, some will say, two sets are equal in 
numerosity if and only if they can be placed in one-to-one correspondence.  The fact that the 
set of integers is thus equal to a proper subset of itself is just an odd phenomenon characteris-
tic of infinite sets, which any suitably modern and open-minded individual will accept once 
accustomed to it.  Gödel ([1947] 1983) held this view, and Cantor himself said, “There is no 
contradiction when, as often happens with infinite aggregates, two aggregates of which one is 
a part of the other have the same cardinal number,” and further, “I regard the non-recognition 
of this fact as the principal obstacle to the introduction of transfinite numbers” (quoted in 
Jourdain 1915, 75; my emphasis). 
But in a clear sense, Salviati was right and Cantor was wrong.  
The concept of relative size with which Salviati and his author were equipped, taken 
in whole, cannot be applied consistently to infinite sets.  For Galileo, these concepts involved 
at least two principles:   
Euclid’s Principle (Common Notion 5):  The whole is greater than the part (i.e., 
strictly greater than any proper part).  
 
Hume’s Principle:  Two collections are equal in numerosity if and only if their 
members can be put in one-to-one correspondence.20 
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 Galileo did not spell out these principles, let alone call them by these names, but they are clearly implicit in 
his statement of the paradox.   
In recent debates on neo-logicism (e.g., Hale and Wright 2001, Demopoulos 2006), ‘Hume’s Principle’ 
usually refers to Frege’s implicit definition of the numbers, stating that two classes have the same number if and 
only if they can be put in 1-1 correspondence ([1884] 1980, 73).  What Hume actually wrote is, “When two 
numbers are so combin’d as that one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce 
them equal” (Treatise I, iii, I).  ‘Number’ here is taken to mean ‘set’ or something like it (Tait 1996, 241; De-
mopoulos 2006, 109), so Hume is merely defining equality, not introducing numbers as objects.  Tait (1996) 
objects to the phrase ‘Hume’s Principle’ in application to infinite sets, since Hume himself disavowed the infi-
nite, but for us, the question of whether, and how univocally, to extend Hume’s finitary principle to the infinite 
is at issue. 
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In daily life, the collections we reckon about are mostly finite (if conceived as collections—
usually excluding regions of space and the like), and like Anzahl and power, the above prin-
ciples always agree in such cases.  For those not studied in these matters, the two principles 
are not distinguished at all; they are integral parts of a single concept, which we divide only 
in post hoc “analysis.”  Galileo’s own inability to separate the two principles is evidence for 
the unity of this pre-theoretic concept.  Though he does implicitly suggest the conflict be-
tween them, and thus their distinctness, he never considers the possibility of a notion of size 
under which one of the principles fails.  Both principles appear to have been firmly en-
trenched in his conception of numerosity, and experience with students shows that the same 
is true for many today.  Such a concept of numerosity, as Galileo showed, cannot be applied 
to the infinite.   
Cantor was wrong in that there is a contradiction when an aggregate and a proper part 
of it have the same cardinal number, namely the contradiction between the above two prin-
ciples.  Cantor only avoided this by abandoning the first.  Of course, he might have meant 
that there is no contradiction under his technical concept of cardinality, but then to call this 
cardinal number, in the general sense of numerosity, just ignores the fact that Euclid’s Prin-
ciple was so deeply ingrained in our intuitive notion of (or entrenched beliefs about) nume-
rosity.  Furthermore, such a reading would make his next remark about “the non-recognition 
of this fact” very strange.  How could anyone have recognized a fact about his technical con-
cept before he introduced it? 
The dogmatic view that Cantor’s analysis was right and those of Galileo and Bolzano 
(the latter discussed below) mistaken is fairly common today, perhaps due in part to Gödel’s 
([1947] 1983) arguments (also discussed below).21  The MCA suggests a more pluralistic res-
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 Frege and Russell were also committed to power as the essential concept of numerosity (Frege [1884] 1980, 
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olution of the paradox (one that some readers may regard as obvious and standard, but others 
will disagree).  There are at least two ways to characterize the relative size of sets, namely 
Euclid’s Principle and Hume’s.  Euclid’s defines what we might call the ‘greater’ of inclu-
sion:  one set is greaterinc than another if it properly includes the other.  (This obviously has 
very limited application, but as we will see, it can be extended.)  Hume’s suggests the ‘great-
er’ of power:  one set is greaterpow than another if there is a bijection between latter and a 
subset of the former, but not between the former and a subset of the latter.  Only greaterpow 
has generated a rich theory of relative size for arbitrary sets, and only greaterpow concerns the 
intrinsic size of sets as sets, independent of ordering or any other property imposed on a set 
or derived from the nature of its elements.  Nonetheless, both notions are in some degree legi-
timate heirs to the pre-theoretic notion of numerosity, in virtue of the entrenchment and see-
mingly analytic status of our two principles.  Cantor’s notion of cardinality is not the unique-
ly right concept, but a particularly elegant and useful one.  This pluralistic resolution harmo-
nizes with Cantor’s own notion of concept splitting and his professed conceptual libertarian-
ism, yet it is clear from the above quotes, and other considerations below, that this is not how 
Cantor himself always saw the matter. 
I have said Galileo was right that his concept of number did not apply to the infinite, 
but this does not contradict the conceptual pluralism I am endorsing.  Galileo was right about 
his concept, understood in terms of his tacit commitment to both principles, i.e., his disincli-
nation to consider rejecting one.  Further, this was apparently the conception of many, for 
several before him drew the same conclusion, that ‘more’ and so on do not apply to the infi-
nite, and few suggested the possibility of a ‘more’ that violates one of the principles (Duhem 
[1954] 1985; cf. notes 18, 19 above).  Yet, understood in terms of common, explicit conven-
                                                                                                                                                        
73, 98; Russell [1903] 1992, Chapter IX).  
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tions, “the concept” of numerosity was unsettled on the question of whether both principles 
must be upheld simultaneously in the infinite case.  The matter was disputed.  (See note 18.)   
Galileo came rather close to step (1) of the NMMA.  He concluded from his paradox 
that the notion of numerosity simply does not apply to the infinite.  It is not that all infinite 
sets are equal, as he makes clear in the above quote and elsewhere (33).  The concept of rela-
tive size does not apply at all.  One might take this to mean that the question of whether the 
squares are fewer than the positive integers or not has no determinate answer, but this is not 
quite right.  Galileo gave an answer: “[N]either is the number of squares less than the totality 
of numbers, nor the latter greater than the former” (32).  So for him, the answer to all such 
questions is ‘No’—or perhaps, if we do not read the last quote too closely, ‘We cannot speak 
of such relations among infinities’ (31).  In any case, a ‘yes’ is strictly ruled out.  If we ask 
what was the answer according to widely acknowledged, explicit conventions, then there is 
room for a ‘yes’ or a ‘no,’ but Galileo takes the paradox (derived from his tacit principles) to 
establish a more definite answer.  
We can reasonably say that step (2) is present in Galileo’s discussion, for he makes 
the concerns behind his paradox quite clear.  The section of the Dialogues in which it appears 
proposes a notoriously speculative and unsuccessful explanation for the cohesion of bodies:  
that a solid contains infinitely many miniscule vacua, and it is nature’s resistance to these va-
cua that somehow accounts for the rather strong cohesion of solids.22  (He describes an inge-
nious experiment showing that the force engendered by a single macroscopic vacuum is not 
enough.)  This account presupposes that a solid is composed of infinitely many indivisible 
parts.  But to that there is an old objection (Murdoch 1982), which Simplicio, the Aristotelian 
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 The existence of the infinitely many vacua is argued from an ancient relative of the paradox itself, namely the 
Wheel Paradox of the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanica.  
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antagonist in the dialogue, puts in terms of lines rather than solids.  If a line is composed of 
infinitely many parts, then a longer line has an even greater infinity of parts, which seems ab-
surd to the pre-Cantorian.  “This assigning to an infinite quantity a value greater than infini-
ty,” Simplicio says, “is quite beyond my comprehension” (Galileo [1638] 1954, 31). 
Galileo has Salviati reply as follows (anticipating Kant’s idea that antinomies arise 
from stretching our concepts beyond their proper domains):   
This is one of the difficulties which arise when we attempt, with our finite minds, to 
discuss the infinite, assigning to it those properties which we give to the finite and li-
mited; but this I think is wrong, for we cannot speak of infinite quantities as being the 
one greater or less than or equal to another.  To prove this I have in mind an argu-
ment... (ibid.) 
 
And here the paradox appears.  Hence there is little doubt about its purpose:  to show that rel-
ative size does not apply to infinite collections, and thus to defeat Simplicio’s objection to the 
particulate analysis of continuous bodies.23  More generally, in seeking to escape the line pa-
radox, Galileo was concerned with the puzzling relations between numerosity and geometric 
magnitude.  Thus, what he required from a notion of transfinite numerosity was to illuminate 
those relations, to determine whether a continuum can coherently be decomposed into infi-
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 One may wonder how one paradox can refute another very similar one, but Galileo’s Paradox accomplished 
this in two ways:  First, it showed that the line paradox does not arise from the continuous nature of lines, since 
Salviati’s version concerns the discrete set of whole numbers.  Denying the particulate analysis of continua does 
not resolve the square number paradox, so a more general solution is needed, and Galileo offers one.  Secondly, 
the number paradox provided reason to think that Simplicio’s argument was invalid.  Salviati’s paradox in-
volved two collections, the positive integers and the squares, which very plausibly do exist and which do consist 
of infinitely many parts, with much the same puzzling results as the line paradox.  If we accept this much 
(though one might not, instead denying any actual infinity), then an example of the same form, such as the line 
paradox, cannot show that composition from infinitely many parts is impossible.  Neither of these points de-
pends on Galileo’s particular way of resolving the square number paradox. 
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nitely many indivisible parts, and ultimately, to determine whether an infinity of point-vacua 
can somehow account for the strong cohesion of bodies.  As we will see, Bolzano and Cantor 
too were much interested in the relations between numerosity and magnitude, the nature and 
structure of continua, and even physical applications.   
In effect, Galileo also executed step (3), but with limited success.  By declaring that 
the language of relative size does not apply to the infinite, he was supporting one proposed 
refinement of the public concept of numerosity.  He does not appear to have regarded this as 
a stipulation; he instead took it to be proved by the paradox, tacitly taking both Euclid’s and 
Hume’s Principle for granted.  Nonetheless, he asserted a clear boundary where none was 
publicly established, and which he was therefore free to impose without contradicting any 
established rules or theory.  This did at least partly determine an appropriate reponse to his 
implicit question whether the squares are fewer than the wholes: either ‘No’ (for no such rela-
tions hold among infinite sets) or, ‘That concept does not apply.’  However, the bearing of 
this result on his background motivations was limited.  It did imply a kind of degenerate 
analysis of the relations between magnitude and numerosity, namely that infinite sets have no 
relations of greater and lesser numerosity, regardless of the magnitudes of the wholes they 
compose.  But this is quite a crude and unenlightening analysis compared to Cantor’s, and 
besides defusing Simplicio’s objection, Galileo’s solution of the paradox did nothing to clari-
fy the tenability of the analysis of continua into indivisibles, nor the feasibility of Galileo’s 
hypothesis about vacua and cohesion.  It was at best a weak partial solution of the larger phi-
losophical problem. 
III. BOLZANO 
Bolzano boldly claimed that infinite sets differed in numerosity, and that transfinite 
numerosity did not satisfy both Euclid’s Principle and Hume’s (though again, see note 18).  
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He even recognized the divergence of those principles as a necessary and sufficient condition 
for infinity ([1851] 1950), though he did not, like Dedekind ([1888] 1901), adopt it as a defi-
nition.  But unlike Cantor, Bolzano saw Euclid’s Principle, not Hume’s, as indispensible to 
the notion of quantity.  Despite the existence of a bijection between two sets, he claimed, they 
“can still stand in a relation of inequality in the sense that the one is found to be a whole, and 
the other a part of that whole” ([1851] 1950, 98).24 
This he argued from two paradoxes similar to Galileo’s, but involving continuous 
sets.  He showed first that the real numbers in the interval [0, 5] can be matched with those in 
[0, 12] by means of the equation 5y = 12x.  Analogously, he exhibited a bijection between the 
points in a line segment ac and an arbitrary proper segment ab, a version of Simplicio’s line 
paradox.  In an earlier work ([1837] 1973), Bolzano considered a generalization of Galileo’s 
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 Berg (1962, 177; 1973) seems to grant Bolzano deathbed absolution by claiming that Bolzano had renounced 
his allegiance to Euclid’s Principle in his last days.  He points out that, in a letter to a pupil dated March 9, 1848, 
Bolzano retracts the conclusion that Sm infinitely exceeds Sm+1 (see my next paragraph).  “Hence,” writes Berg, 
“it seems that at the last Bolzano confined the doctrine that the whole is greater than its parts to the finite case 
and accepted [bijection] as a sufficient condition for the identity of powers of infinite sets” (1962, repeated al-
most verbatim in 1973).  But Bolzano’s renunciation (published in Bolzano [1837] 1973) is too obscure to es-
tablish that he accepted Hume’s Principle.  In fact, Bolzano continued to deny that principle in the Paradoxes, 
which he worked on at least until September 30, 1848 (Steele 1950), more than six months after the cited letter.  
(On the other hand, the quality of the posthumous editing of the Paradoxes has been criticized; see Steele 1950, 
54-5.)  Furthermore, Bolzano’s Paradoxes does treat a variation on Galileo’s Paradox in a manner that is appar-
ently consistent with the remarks of his letter (and using similar ‘Sm’ notation), and yet connects it with lessons 
learned from the failure of Hume’s Principle ([1851] 1950, 115; cf. 100, 110, 114).  There Bolzano does not 
accept the mere existence of a bijection as sufficient for the equinumerosity of infinite sets; only some connec-
tion in the “mode of specification or of generation” is sufficient (98).  If one sequence is produced from another 
by squaring each term, for example, then the two sequences have the same number of elements (partly anticipat-
ing Gödel’s argument discussed below).  For Bolzano, this does not contradict Euclid’s Principle because he 
distinguishes between terms that have the same value, so that the result of squaring the terms in the sequence 1, 
2, 3,… is not a proper subsequence of that sequence.  Strange, vague, and problematic as these views are, we 
have no proof that they cannot be developed into a consistent and interesting theory.  Berg’s attribution of a 
Cantorian view to Bolzano looks suspiciously like a symptom of the Cantorian hegemony.   
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square number paradox (without citing Galileo).  To put it in modern terms, he defined the 
sequences Sm = +∈Zn
m
n }{ 2  for each m ∈ N and argued that each Sm contains infinitely many 
more terms than Sm + 1 .     
Much like Galileo, Bolzano attributed the “air of paradox” (in the continuous exam-
ples at least) to the over-extension of notions from the finite case.  When a bijection between 
finite sets is possible, “then indeed are the two finite sets always equal in respect of multiplic-
ity.  The illusion is therefore created that this ought to hold when the sets are no longer fi-
nite...” (ibid., 98).  However, far from concluding that questions of size are vague or indeter-
minate in the infinite case, or like Galileo, that the notion of size does not apply—far then 
from initiating our naïve method25—Bolzano regarded it as proved by the so-called paradoxes 
that bijection does not entail equinumerosity.  For Bolzano, being a proper part constituted a 
notion of ‘smaller.’  At least twice (pp. 95, 98) he remarked that an infinite set can be greater 
than another “in the sense that” the two are related as whole to part.26   
Despite his own view of the matter, Bolzano was in fact free to choose among Euc-
lid’s principles.  The very fact that he took the paradoxes to refute Hume’s Principle in the 
infinite case is further evidence that before Cantor, Euclid’s Principle was integral to tacit 
conceptions of number, and Hume’s was not the uniquely essential principle of numerosity.  
Indeed, there is a clear sense in which there are more whole numbers than perfect squares, for 
‘more’ often means ‘additional.’  The whole numbers include the squares and more, i.e., oth-
ers.  A notion of numerosity that does not reflect this would seem to be missing something 
basic.  Even in current mathematics, one sometimes uses “small” in a Bolzanian sense.  For 
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 Bolzano did, however, attribute certain mistakes in calculating infinite sums to expressions being “devoid of 
objective reference” ([1851] 1950, 112-114). 
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 But notice also a hint of pluralism: “in the sense that” suggests the possibility of a different sense.  
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example, a σ-algebra is often defined as “the smallest” set with certain properties.  What is 
meant in that case is not the set of smallest power (for that does not even pick out a unique 
set), but rather the unique set, with the specified properties, such that no proper subset has 
those properties.  And even Gödel, in the midst of arguing that Cantor’s concepts are forced 
on us ([1947] 1983), said that new axioms can “increase the number of decidable proposi-
tions” (520).  But the set of such propositions always has the power of the integers!  What 
Gödel meant by “increase the number” was just to expand the set of decidable propositions to 
a proper superset of the former—a Bolzanian use of ‘number.’ 
The notion of proper inclusion on its own is not a very satisfying notion of ‘greater,’ 
for it leaves vastly many27 sets incomparable to each other.  However, it is not unreasonable 
to extend the finitary notion of ‘greater’ to a merely partial ordering on the infinite sets.  This 
would at least seem to be an improvement on Galileo’s strict confinement of relative size to 
the finite.  Furthermore, it is possible to extend any partial ordering to a strict weak ordering 
‘<’ on the subsets of any well-ordered set, and hence, given the Axiom of Choice, on the sub-
sets of any set (Duggan 1999).  In a strict weak ordering, the incomparable sets form equiva-
lence classes, so we can regard any two incomparable sets as equal in “size.”  We thus obtain 
a total preorder ‘<’ that extends both the relation of ‘no greater than’ on finite sets and the 
subset relation ‘⊆’.28  Hence we can define notions of smaller, greater, and equal, as broadly 
as we like, while respecting Euclid’s Principle (but abandoning Hume’s).   
There are two worries about this argument:  First, the relations defined might not re-
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 Vastly many, that is, under Cantor’s notion of cardinality, and in any case, infinitely many. 
28
 We can also choose the extension to be compatible, meaning that if two sets in the old domain (the finite sets) 
were not of equal size (i.e., if not both A < B and B < A), they do not have equal size in the extended relation 
either (Duggan 1999). 
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spect other intuitive principles of size, and may thus seem undeserving of that name.  For ex-
ample, let us say a relation ‘<’ on sets is monotonic if A < B if and only if A\B < B\A (a gene-
ralization of Euclid’s Principle).  Duggan’s powerful extension theorem (1999) shows that for 
a very broad class of properties, binary relations that have those properties can be extended to 
totality while preserving the properties.  As it happens, monotonicity is not one of the proper-
ties covered by Duggan’s theorem (since it is not “arc-receptive”), but this in itself does not 
rule out the possibility that there are total monotonic extensions of the ‘less than’ and proper 
subset relations, perhaps in virtue of some other provable extension theorem.   
If not, so be it.  We already know that no extension of the notion of size preserves 
every property of size that holds for finite sets.  An extension cannot preserve both Hume’s 
Principle and Euclid’s.  As Cantor wrote, some authors “begin by attributing to the numbers 
in question all the properties of finite numbers, whereas the infinite numbers, if they are to be 
thinkable in any form, must constitute quite a new kind of number” (quoted in Jourdain 1915, 
74).29  If we wish to speak at all about different sizes of infinity, we must choose the proper-
ties of size to preserve. 
Secondly, we might worry, especially given Duggan’s appeal to the Axiom of Choice, 
that total extensions of the subset relation would be quite arbitrary and uninteresting.  But 
given the power of Duggan’s theorem, there may be many possible extensions, and perhaps 
some among them are especially interesting.  In any case, being interesting is a separate con-
cern from being logically possible.  I concede that Cantor’s notion of cardinal number is 
probably the most interesting, elegant, intuitively appealing, and useful extension of nume-
rosity to the infinite.  I mainly want to insist that such virtues do not make it the uniquely cor-
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 Though Cantor continues anti-pluralistically, “the nature of this new kind of number is dependent on the na-
ture of things and is an object of investigation, but not of our arbitrariness or our prejudice” (ibid.).    
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rect notion of numerosity in the sense of verisimilitude.  Unless we presuppose a semantics in 
which ‘size’ automatically designates some particularly eligible property, of which we might 
have true or false conceptions, the notion of verisimilitude does not apply.  So ignoring such 
semantic considerations, Bolzano was free to choose without risk of being mistaken.     
Bolzano did not make the motivations for his Paradoxes ([1851] 1950) explicit, but it 
is clear that some of them were shared with Galileo.  As Cantor noted ([1883b] 1976, 78), the 
main purpose of the book was to defend the actual infinite, including the constitution of con-
tinuous bodies out of point-like atoms, against many apparent contradictions.  Bolzano criti-
cized various leaps of logic that others had made, and he took particular interest in divergent 
infinite sums as well as time.  But like Galileo, he also grappled with the curious relations 
between numerosity and geometric magnitude, defended the analysis of space and matter into 
a continuum of points, and even attempted to use this analysis to explain physical phenome-
na.   
Bolzano distinguished the magnitude of a spatial extension from the numerosity of the 
set of points of which it consists ([1851] 1950, 134-5), and then asserted various propositions 
about magnitude and numerosity, such as that if two figures are perfectly similar, the num-
bers of their points stand in the same ratio as their geometric magnitudes (136).  [He de-
fended this from an objection similar to Simplicio’s line paradox, and closer still to the Wheel 
Paradox, by repeating his rejection of Hume’s Principle (137).]  Later in the book, he hy-
pothesized that the whole of infinite space was completely filled with substances, and yet var-
ious parts were filled with different degrees of density (161).  To defend this, Bolzano urged 
that “there is no sort of impossibility in one and the same (infinite) set of atoms being distri-
buted, now in a larger region without a single point standing solitary there, now in a second 
and contracted region without a single point requiring to absorb two atoms” (162), and re-
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ferred the reader to his versions of Galileo’s Paradox.30  Thus, Bolzano was concerned with 
relations between magnitude and numerosity, the particulate analysis of continua, and physi-
cal applications. 
Like Galileo, Bolzano took the paradoxes to prove something, but by taking them to 
prove one thing rather than another, he imposed a conceptual refinement.  No doubt he did so 
with an eye to some of the motivations noted above.  But like Galileo’s, his success was quite 
limited.  He found many applications for his rather vague conception of infinite numerosity in 
the Paradoxes, but most seem to have been incoherent and fruitless. 
 
IV.  CANTOR 
Cantor’s approach to the infinite seems to have been closer to the NMMA than those 
of Galileo or Bolzano.  Though Cantor did not explicitly claim that questions of relative size 
for infinite sets lacked uniquely right answers, he was somewhat pluralistic about concepts of 
transfinite number, and as I will explain, this suggests that even for him, some questions 
about relative numerosity were indeterminate until refined.  Furthermore, he did, unlike Gali-
leo and Bolzano, regard himself as extending the concept of number, and he did so under the 
influence of certain specific motives. 
By 1887, Cantor clearly endorsed multiple notions of number, including power and 
Anzahl (by then taking the additional names of cardinal and ordinal number), as well as the 
more general notion of order type ([1887-8] 1962).  It is often thought that power was always 
the primary notion of number for Cantor (e.g., Ferreirós 1999, 265, 270), who did make sev-
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 The point of referring to the paradoxes was apparently to show that a continuum of atoms, with no gaps, could 
nonetheless be compressed into a smaller region, increasing its density.  But this seems incompatible with his 
assertion that the ratio between numbers of elements equals the ratio between magnitudes. 
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eral remarks about the basic, general, and intrinsic character of power, ([1882] 1962, 150; 
Grattan-Guinness 1970, 86).  Ferreirós points to those remarks as well as the structure of 
Cantor’s “most mature work,” the Beiträge ([1895-7] 1915), in which the cardinals are intro-
duced before the ordinals.  But the remarks in question leave some room for interpretation 
and are counteracted by others.  In fact, it was Anzahl that Cantor first called the “number of 
elements” of an infinite set,31 in the Grundlagen, while power retained its less suggestive 
moniker for some time.32  Even in the Beiträge, to which Ferreirós appeals, Cantor exalted 
the notion of order type.  That concept, he wrote,  
…embraces, in conjunction with the concept of ‘cardinal number’ or ‘power’ intro-
duced in Section 1, everything capable of being numbered that is thinkable, and in this 
sense cannot be further generalized.  It contains nothing arbitrary, but is the natural 
extension of the concept of number. (117)  
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 “In the case of infinite aggregates, on the other hand, absolutely nothing has so far been said, either in my own 
papers or elsewhere, concerning a precisely defined number of their elements [Anzahl der Elemente]” (Cantor 
[1883] 1976, 71; 1962, 167).  But soon, “Another great gain…is a new concept not previously in existence, the 
concept of the number of elements [Anzahl der Elemente] of a well-ordered infinite manifold ([1883] 1976, 71; 
1962, 168).  However one translates ‘Anzahl’ here, ‘Anzahl der Elemente’ strongly suggests a notion of nume-
rosity rather than position in a series. 
32
 His first use of ‘cardinal number’ in print appeared in 1887 ([1887-8] 1962).  Jourdain (1915) quotes Cantor 
using it in a lecture of 1883, and a footnote from Cantor attributes the relevant part of [1887-8] 1962 to a lecture 
of that year and a letter of 1884 (p. 387).  Strangely, though, Cantor did not to my knowledge use ‘cardinal’ in 
any publications or other letters before 1887.  Even in his review of Frege’s Grundlagen (Cantor [1885] 1962) 
and his 1886, Cantor used ‘ordinal number’ but not ‘cardinal,’ and kept power distinctly separate from number 
[even though Frege had argued (using different words) that Cantor’s Anzahlen were ordinal numbers and his 
powers were cardinals ([1884] 1980, 98).]  It seems plausible, then, that Cantor only inserted the phrase ‘cardi-
nal number’ into the later published form of his lecture (and perhaps likewise for the 1885 letter published as 
part VIII of [1887-8] 1962).  Jourdain may have used ‘cardinal number’ anachronistically, as many authors do. 
believing that Cantor always thought of power as the fundamental notion of numerosity.  If so, the cardi-
nal/ordinal terminology was probably spurred by Frege’s remarks and further justified by Cantor’s development 
of cardinal arithmetic.  (See note 37.) 
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Power, then, was not unequivocally privileged, for Cantor.  The best we could say for it in 
light of this quote is that it was somehow “conjoined,” to or within, the natural extension of 
number.  The pluralism here, encompassing at least power and order type, is explicit.   
Still, one might infer from Cantor’s “ordinal/cardinal” terminology that power was his 
only concept of numerosity.  He even wrote, “The ‘powers’ represent the unique and neces-
sary generalization of the finite ‘cardinal numbers’” ([1891] 1996, 922).  But as we have just 
seen, it was the Anzahlen that first took that position.  In the Grundlagen, Cantor made it 
clear that he regarded Anzahl as a notion of numerosity, relativized to an ordering:   
[A] finite aggregate exhibits the same number of elements [Anzahl von Elementen]33 
for every order of succession that can be given to its elements; on the other hand, dif-
ferent numbers [Anzahlen] will in general have to be attributed to aggregates consist-
ing of infinitely many elements, depending upon the order of succession given to the 
elements” ([1883] 1976, 72; 1962, 168). 
 
This was natural, given the way in which the Anzahlen emerged from Cantor’s theory of 
point sets.  As is well documented (Jourdain 1915), they sprang from the indexes on his “de-
rived sets” P(ν), where P' = P(1) is the set of limit points of a set P, and P(ν + 1) = P(ν)' (1872).  
Cantor later defined P(∞) as the intersection of all derived sets P(ν) for ν a positive integer 
([1880] 1962).  Intuitively, P(∞) was the result of taking the derivative infinitely many times 
(once for every positive integer) and P(∞ + ν) the result of taking it ν more times.  This helps 
explain how the Anzahlen represented a kind of numerosity; they answered the question, 
“How many times?”  
Hence there was some pluralism in Cantor’s conception of numerosity.  Already in 
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 Again, this expression strongly suggest numerosity.  
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the Grundlagen, the claim that the original concept of number splits in two implied that both 
power and Anzahl were in some degree legitimate heirs to the title of ‘number.’  Such plural-
ism suggests that even for Cantor, certain questions about the relative size of infinite sets 
were indeterminate prior to his refinements.  Consider the ordered set (1, 4, 9, 16,...; 2, 3, 5, 
6...), i.e., the positive integers arranged so that the squares come first.  Is this ordered set big-
ger than its infinite initial segment (1, 4, 9,...)?  With respect to Anzahl, yes:  The former se-
quence has the ordinal 2ω, while the latter has ordinal ω.  But with respect to power, no.  
Hence, the question requires refinement.  In fact, even the question of the Anzahl alone may 
be indeterminate, for it depends on the ordering that we apply to a set.  In particular, Galileo’s 
question whether the squares are fewer than the positive integers may be seen as indetermi-
nate, even rejecting Euclid’s Principle, provided that ‘fewer’ can be understood in terms of 
Anzahl and one does not take the natural orderings for granted.  Thus, Cantor’s own ideas 
implied that some questions of relative size, and by a stretch even Galileo’s, were insuffi-
ciently precise to determine an answer.   
However, Cantor’s pluralism and libertarianism did not extend to Euclid’s Principle.  
We have already noted his claim that there is simply no contradiction when a set has the same 
cardinality as a proper subset.  As well, the Beiträge contained a venomous assault ([1895-7] 
1915; 117-118) on Veronese’s definition of equality, which attempted a compromise between 
Euclid’s Principle and Cantor’s Anzahlen:  “Numbers whose units correspond to one another 
uniquely and in the same order and of which the one is neither a part of the other nor equal to 
a part of the other are equal” (quoted in Cantor, ibid.).34  Cantor criticized the circularity of 
this definition (ibid.), but according to Dauben (1979, 234) he also objected to its arbitrari-
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 Veronese’s work is now regarded as an important forerunner to that of Robinson, Conway, and Ehrlich, the 
latter two of which generalize Cantor’s transfinite numbers (Ehrlich 2006). 
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ness.  “He complained to Peano that Veronese believed the definition of equality, both for 
numbers and for order types, was entirely at the mercy of one’s choice, which was a heretical 
suggestion from Cantor’s point of view…” (ibid.)  On Dauben’s reading, Cantor was much 
more the dogmatic essentialist than the Grundlagen’s libertarian declarations would suggest.   
Hence, Cantor might appear to have been inconsistent on the subject of mathematical 
freedom.  In the Grundlagen he defended the actual infinite both by waxing grandiloquent on 
the freedom of mathematics and by claiming that his theory was forced on him ([1883b] 
1976, 75).  But perhaps he can be seen as occupying a coherent middle ground:  He was 
forced to recognize certain extensions of the notion of number, he might have said, but not to 
forsake all others.  The forcing he refers to is best understood in terms of his derived point 
sets.  Taking repeated derivatives and infinitary unions, Cantor obtained sets with larger and 
larger transfinite indices, a process he called “necessary” and “free from any arbitrariness” 
([1880] 1962, 148).  Without these indices, many of his future results on point sets would 
have been unattainable, including the Cantor-Bendixson Theorem (1884a) and the important 
theorem that any set with a countable αth derivative, for any Anzahl α, has zero outer content 
(the lower limit of the total length of any set of covering intervals), and hence, in modern 
terms, zero measure (1883a).  Considered independently of point sets, the Anzahlen enabled 
Cantor to establish an infinite hierarchy of infinite powers, having only established two infi-
nite powers before, and to show that there is a unique second infinite power, seemingly a step 
toward Cantor’s goal of proving the Continuum Hypothesis.  Thus Cantor was forced to rec-
ognize the Anzahlen by their apparent naturalness and his need to employ them, but none of 
this required him to dismiss other notions of transfinite number.  After all, he later incorpo-
rated power and order type as additional concepts of number (1887; [1895-7] 1915).35   
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 It is not clear, then, why Cantor categorically rejected Euclid’s Principle.  Surely it was in part because the 
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Moreover, Cantor called Anzahl and order type extensions of the concept of number 
([1883b] 1976; ([1895-7] 1915), not mere descriptions of its transfinite implications.  He 
even called Anzahl “a new concept not previously in existence” ([1883b] 1976, 71, Cantor’s 
emphasis) and pointed out that any transfinite number must be “quite a new kind of number” 
(Jourdain 1915, 74).  Hence he did not see himself, like Galileo and Bolzano, as merely de-
ducing facts about the sizes of transfinite sets from a well established notion of number, but 
as defining new concepts.  If he did not regard this as mere stipulation, it can only be because 
he thought that some concepts were coherent and counted as concepts of number, while oth-
ers, not.  But that much is perfectly consistent with the NMMA.   
If we take Cantor’s words seriously, then, we must conclude that he saw see himself 
as extending the concept of number, and with some degree of freedom.  Further, he did so in 
light of some explicitly acknowledged motivations.  He cited a need to employ the Anzahlen 
in the theory of point sets as well as some applications to function theory ([1883b] 1976).  
But he also stated goals in philosophy and natural science that help to explain his interest in 
both the Anzahlen and the powers, namely the resolution of certain difficulties in the philo-
sophical systems of Leibniz and Spinoza, which he thought would help us to develop a rigor-
ous and “organic” account of nature.  The standard account of Cantor’s motives largely ig-
                                                                                                                                                        
Euclidean notions of number on offer, such as Bolzano’s and Veronese’s, seemed incoherent.  But one is also 
led to speculate that Cantor’s bouts of dogmatism were partly because of his vitriolic debate with Veronese over 
the coherence of infinitesimals.  [The opposite has been suggested, i.e., that Cantor opposed Veronese because 
he was dogmatic about his concept of number, but Cantor vehemently denied infinitesimals as early as 1878 
(Ewald 1996, 867), well before introducing his transfinite numbers.] 
It is worth noting too that Cantor’s Anzahlen made some concessions to Euclid’s Principle.  Not every 
proper part of a well ordered set has smaller Anzahl than the whole, but every proper initial segment does.  The 
Anzahlen thus partly reflect the idea, encoded in Euclid’s Principle, that if we add more elements to an infinite 
set, we have a larger set, though for Anzahlen this only holds if the new elements are added at (or sufficiently 
near) the end of a sequence. 
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nores these remarks and places his main motives within mainstream function theory (e.g., 
Jourdain 1906-13; 1915; Dauben 1979).  However, Ferreirós (2004) makes a strong case that 
Cantor was not chiefly concerned with mainstream mathematics but with broad biological, 
physical, and even spiritual matters.  Cantor is quite explicit about this in an 1884 letter:  
 
I have been working on this project of a precise deepening into the essence of every-
thing organic for 14 years already.  It constitutes the real motivation why I have con-
fronted, and during this time have never lost sight of, the fatiguing enterprise of inves-
tigating point-sets, which promises little recognition.  (Ferreirós 2004)  
 
Through the background of German Romantic Naturphilosophie and Cantor’s own testimo-
ny, Ferreirós shows that by “organic” Cantor did not simply mean biological; rather he 
sought a natural philosophy unifying mechanistic and spiritual elements.   
Cantor’s work on this program raised key mathematical goals for his theory of the 
transfinite, namely to illuminate what we now call the topological and measure-theoretic fea-
tures of physical space and objects.  For example, he proposed an analysis of matter into a 
countable infinity of point-like corporeal “monads” and a continuum of point-like ethereal 
monads, and used his theorems on point sets, power, continuity, and outer content to offer 
explanations of various physical phenomena (Ferreirós 2004).  Thus Cantor’s investigation of 
the transfinite was in considerable part motivated by an interest in the qualitative structural 
features of space and matter.  In particular, he shared with Galileo and Bolzano an interest in 
the relations between numerosity and geometric magnitude (addressed by Cantor in terms of 
dimension and outer content), the analysis of matter into a continuum of points, and the ap-
plication of this analysis to explain physical phenomena. 
Cantor did not deliberately design his concept of cardinal number to serve those goals, 
but that concept developed very gradually under their influence, each conceptual develop-
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ment being spurred by new applications and results.  Cantor took up questions about bijection 
even before 1869 (Ferreirós 2004, 52), long before arriving at the notions of power, counta-
bility, and last of all cardinal number.  Soon after he raised the question of a bijection be-
tween the whole numbers and the reals, in an 1873 letter to Dedekind, he wrote, “[I]t has no 
special practical interest for me.  And I entirely agree with you when you say that for this rea-
son it does not deserve much effort” (Ewald 1996, 844).  Yet an answer, he pointed out, 
would yield a new proof of the existence and density of the transcendental numbers, and once 
Cantor accomplished that, Dedekind remarked that this proved the problem was interesting 
and worthy of effort (ibid., 848).  In 1877 Cantor developed the proof that there is a bijection 
between a line segment and any n-dimensional continuum, and simultaneously began using 
the word ‘power’ (Ewald 1996, 853ff.).  In the publication of that result (1878), he even de-
fined the notions of smaller and larger powers, and pointed out the fact that the even num-
bers have the same power as the positive integers.  The term ‘countable’ or ‘denumerable’ did 
not appear until 1882, when Cantor proved that, in modern terms, an n-dimensional space can 
include at most countably many disjoint open sets ([1882] 1962).  At that time, only sets of 
the first two infinite powers were known.  Only after using the ordinals to generate an infinite 
hierarchy of powers and producing several more theorems on the powers of point sets (in-
cluding that countable sets have zero content; 1883a) did Cantor adopt the term ‘cardinal 
number’ ([1887-8] 1962, from a lecture of late 1883—but see note 34 above).36  Thus his 
                                                 
36Apparently, Cantor had also worked out cardinal arithmetic in a manuscript of 1885.  Jourdain (1915, 79) re-
ports this, but perhaps based on Cantor’s footnote in [1887-88] 1932 (411), which is in fact a bit vague (“[E]r ist 
der Hauptsache nach vor bald drei Jahren verfaβt…”).  In any case, if Cantor did develop cardinal arithmetic 
before or simultaneously with adopting the term ‘cardinal number’ (also contrary to Jourdain; see note 34), then 
this would further explain Cantor’s construal of power as cardinal number, for, one justification he gave for call-
ing his ordinals by the name ‘number’ was their possession of a systematic arithmetic (in an 1882 letter; Ewald 
1996, 876).   
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concept of cardinal number evolved, in a dialectical milieu of applications and innovations, 
most of which concerned the structure of continuous spaces and point sets within them.  If 
Cantor did not deliberately design the concept to shed light on such matters, those interests 
nonetheless seem to have exerted a selection pressure on the concept’s evolution.  In this re-
spect the concept was tooled to fit its motivations. 
The result was tremendously successful.  Cantor’s physical hypotheses were as spe-
culative and mistaken as Galileo’s infinity of point-vacua and Bolzano’s smooth plenum of 
variable density, but still, his theory of transfinite numerosity was much more fruitful than 
those of Galileo and Bolzano concerning all three of the shared motivations we have identi-
fied.  Not only did Cantor offer a way out of objections to the particulate analysis of the con-
tinuum, such as the supposedly absurd consequence that one obtains infinities of different 
sizes—all three thinkers managed that—but he also initiated a rich and ultimately coherent 
theory of such sizes which shed further light on the structure of continua.  He was able to 
show that while there are different sizes of infinity (powers and order types), line segments of 
different lengths have the same power37, and if both segments are closed, the same order type 
(a consequence of [1895-7] 1915, 134), contrary to Simplicio’s argument (Galileo [1638] 
1954, 31).  Thus he was able to distinguish clearly between geometric magnitude and “num-
ber of elements.”  He further showed that continua of different dimensions have the same 
power (1878), and that finite and countable point sets have zero magnitude ([1882] 1962).  
And though his own speculations on the structure of matter failed, his theory of the transfinite 
has in fact afforded some insight into physical phenomena.   
The fact that countable sets have measure zero has been especially useful in this re-
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 In effect, Bolzano showed this too, but he did not have the notion of power, i.e., of an equivalence class in-
duced by bijection, and he did not take a bijection between sets to show anything significant ([1851] 1950). 
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gard.  Given a measure-zero set of possible states for some physical system, it is generally 
plausible to assume that the probability of the system taking on one of those states at a given 
time is zero.  [Poincaré made much use of this assumption in his celestial mechanics ([1892-
99] 1957), and it plays a key role in statistical mechanics (Sklar 1993).]  The same, then, goes 
for countable sets of states.  In one interesting application, Hadamard (1898) showed that, of 
the continuum-many bounded geodesics through a given point on a surface of negative curva-
ture, only countably many are asymptotic to closed curves.  Hence, “almost all” bounded 
curves on such a surface—with regard to power, measure, and frequency—are thoroughly 
non-periodic, and this is reflected in the typically chaotic behavior of many dynamical sys-
tems.  Thus power sheds light on physical phenomena. 
I say that such results—those concerning the structure of continua, the relations be-
tween numerosity and magnitude, and physical phenomena—are good reasons to regard Can-
tor’s theory of the transfinite as successful relative to the goals that he shared with Galileo 
and Bolzano.  Whether this accounts for the popular success of his theory is another question.  
No doubt the fact that countable sets have zero measure largely explains the introduction of 
Cantor’s cardinals in many elementary analysis texts, and this in turn must have contributed 
to their widespread acceptance.  Other contributing factors likely include applications of both 
power and Anzahl in function theory and analysis (Cantor [1884b] 1962, 260; Mittag-Leffler 
1884; Borel 1895; cf. Hallett 1979), the support of Weierstrass, Mittag-Leffler and Hilbert 
(Dauben [1993] 2004; Hilbert [1900] 1902; 1926), Frege and Russell’s use of power in their 
definitions of number (Frege [1884] 1980; [1893-1903] 1962; Russell [1903] 1992), Frege’s 
proof of the axioms of arithmetic from Hume’s Principle ([1893-1903] 1962; cf. Hale and 
Wright 2001), and perhaps most of all, the intrinsic nature of power, the fact that it is inde-
pendent of the nature and ordering of elements (a point emphasized by both Frege [1884] and 
Russell [1903] 1992).  No doubt the last two points are strong reasons to count Cantor’s 
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theory a genuine success, popularity aside, but this is true relative to certain goals, and not the 
ones we have identified as common to our three historical figures.  
To summarize the essential points we have noted about Cantor’s theory, (1) Cantor 
was pluralistic about concepts of numerosity, within limits; (2) such pluralism implied inde-
terminacy in some questions about numerosity; (3) Cantor explicitly stated certain philosoph-
ical and scientific motivations; (4) each of the three common goals we have attributed to Ga-
lileo and Bolzano was either included in or raised by Cantor’s explicit motivations; (5) Can-
tor did devise new concepts of numerosity, though he did not regard them as entirely free in-
ventions; (6) he did so gradually, while discovering applications and results that apparently 
influenced the theory; and (7) the resulting concepts proved to be very useful for the common 
goals we have identified. 
V.  GÖDEL 
The NMMA (Section I) takes it for granted that we can identify questions that lack a 
determinate answer, and that we are free to extend and refine concepts and meanings as we 
wish.  Yet some metaphysicians hold that certain questions, whose answers surely seem inde-
terminate, nonetheless have unique factual answers (Lewis 1984, 1985; Sider 2001 and forth-
coming; Olson 2006).  One might think that the reference of numerosity expressions was 
likewise predetermined, before Cantor’s work, in such a way that any extension of the num-
ber concept that produced different results would be not only inapt but false.  Gödel’s view 
was close to this ([1947] 1983).  He claimed that Cantor’s concept of cardinality as well as 
the axioms of set theory had a self-evident truth that we cannot help but recognize, if we care-
fully examine the concepts that we already loosely grasp.  But in arguing that such ideas are 
forced upon us, Gödel neglects the fact that they are over-determined.  With the concept of 
numerosity as with our other intuitions about sets, the very principles that once seemed unde-
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niable have led to paradoxes, including Galileo’s, and cannot be maintained.  Gödel (op. cit.) 
had an excuse for the other paradoxes of set theory:  they result from misapplying the intui-
tive principles to exotic, impossibly comprehensive collections, such as the set of all sets.  If 
we admit only sets of pre-established objects (the iterative conception of set), the paradoxes 
do not arise.  But this is not so for Galileo’s Paradox; that problem lives right in our back 
yard, among the whole numbers.  If we want to have any notion of transfinite numerosity we 
must face up to it and adopt a notion (or several) that violates either Euclid’s Principle or 
Hume’s (or both).   
Admittedly, Gödel gives a very compelling argument for Hume’s Principle:  If two 
sets can be put in one-to-one correspondence, then we could conceivably alter the individual 
elements of one set until they were indistinguishable from their counterparts in the other, and 
then surely the two sets must have the same numerosity.  I say this is very compelling, but 
nonetheless it is only an intuition pump.  Gödel disregards the fact that Euclid’s Principle is 
also intuitively compelling!  If set A contains everything that is in set B and also some further 
things, then it contains more.  Both Euclid’s and Hume’s Principles seem forced on us.  To 
have a consistent theory of transfinite numerosity, we must break free of these forces, much 
as Gauss and Lobachevsky broke free of the parallel postulate.  We have learned from them 
that intuitions do not limit our freedom to form counterintuitive conceptions.  Even if Hume’s 
Principle seems stronger than Euclid’s, no adequate reason has been given to believe that it is 
unrevisable or a brute fact.  It is up to us to choose our preferred principles, or to articulate an 
arsenal of different concepts incorporating different principles. 
On the other hand, Gödel’s realism might supply a reason to regard a conception as 
false.  If one concept satisfying some of our intuitions has an ontological status privileged 
over others, we might therefore regard that  concept as the one that we had loosely grasped 
all along.  In other words, some special “existence” (or some other property) beyond mere 
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consistency might make one concept more eligible than others.  If such eligibility helps to 
determine reference, then there might be a fact about which transfinite relation is really the 
referent of ‘more’ and other such terms.  Again, it seems wisest to ignore such considerations 
and focus on the motivations for a concept; never mind what the referent of the pre-theoretic 
term is, let us establish new concepts that bake some bread.  But now we may worry that we 
cannot even do that; the “real” objects may be so much more eligible in virtue of their “reali-
ty” that we cannot force our words to mean anything else.  
The usual objection to Gödel’s realism is that it makes our possession of mathemati-
cal knowledge inexplicable (Benacerraf [1973] 1983; cf. Maddy 1996; 1997).  Gödel propos-
es a special faculty of mathematical perception, but since abstract objects lack causal effica-
cy, such a faculty seems impossible.  The objection I have raised just above gives us further 
reason for doubt:  The fact that our intuitions sometimes lead us into paradox suggests that 
we have no trustworthy mathematical perception.  Why then should we suppose that such 
“perception” is anything but prejudice? 
A standard alternative to Gödel’s form of realism is the indispensability argument.  In 
Quinian terms, it says that if we accept a theory, we are committed to the objects over which 
its quantifiers range.  Insofar as our best empirical theories involve quantification over ma-
thematical objects, we should accept that those objects exist (Quine [1948] 1953; Putnam 
1971; 1975b).  However, this faces charges of contradicting mathematical practice, for ma-
thematicians believe in many things that have not yet proven useful (Maddy 1997, 106-7, 
153-160 ).  Maddy (1997) instead proposes that we take mathematical considerations and mo-
tivations, such as the desire to provide a universal foundation for all of mathematics, as the 
arbiters of mathematical truth.  Quine’s and Maddy’s views do not seem to give us reason to 
deny the existence of other objects besides those that serve empirical and mathematical 
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goals,38 but we might worry that scientific usefulness itself implies a strong eligibility that 
prevents us referring to other things.       
But suppose there are indeed irresistible mathematical reference magnets.  How might 
that affect mathematical practice?  Can we not still give alternative definitions and theories, 
and follow out their consequences?  Even if we do not succeed in referring to the things we 
wish to, this has no impact on what we can logically deduce.  Hence it again seems that all 
that is important about a concept or theory, beyond consistency, is its interest and fruitful-
ness.  
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
It has been claimed here that at least some genuinely philosophical problems are solv-
able by the Method of Conceptual Articulation, and some have already been solved by such 
means.  In particular, Galileo’s Paradox was resolved by the articulation of numerosity into 
distinct concepts, including those of proper inclusion, Anzahl, and power.  Granted, none of 
our historical figures saw themselves as stipulating extensions of the concept of number with 
complete freedom.  Cantor in particular seemed to recognize that he was presenting genuine 
extensions, but not arbitrarily; he regarded his multiple conceptions as forced by his mathe-
matical needs, by the determinate iterative process that defined the ordinals, and by consider-
ations of naturalness.  But new extensions they were nonetheless.   
Power has become the basis of an elegant and useful theory and has proven especially 
useful in addressing the motivations common to Galileo, Bolzano and Cantor, namely, to 
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 Gödel of course has argued from his theorems on the incompleteness of arithmetic that there is more to ma-
thematical truth than mere consistency.  But even if we agree with Gödel that there is a unique system of whole 
numbers—a unique intended model for our axioms of arithmetic—that is no reason to deny the existence of 
other objects, of non-standard models of arithmetic.  Indeed, their existence is implied by the incompleteness 
theorems and the completeness of first-order predicate logic. 
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grasp the relations between numerosity and geometric magnitude, to defend the analysis of 
the continuum into points, and to explain physical phenomena.  It is in virtue of its success in 
serving such motivations that Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers constitutes a solution to 
some of the deeper philosophical problems posed by Galileo’s Paradox. 
Nonetheless, to say that power is the only correct notion of numerosity is distorting.  
Anzahl too can be considered as a notion of numerosity, and Cantor did so conceive it.  Fur-
thermore, order extension theorems like Duggan’s give us reason to think that a theory of 
numerosity satisfying Euclid’s Principle is possible. 
In its naïve form, the Method of Conceptual Articulation presupposed that empty 
questions could be identified and concepts freely refined or modified.  These presuppositions 
face many challenges, perhaps most forcefully from externalist theories of reference.  But 
those challenges do not bear on the most important elements of the method.  However refer-
ence works, and whether or not we can distinguish between determinate and indeterminate 
questions, we can still, at least sometimes, identify background motivations for our philo-
sophical puzzles, if perhaps after the fact, and we can articulate concepts, or theories if you 
prefer, that serve to address those motivations.    
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